Security

Address-Swapping Code on 178 Sites: What Miners Check

Code planted on 178 websites on Nov 16 swapped copied crypto addresses. How a solo miner checks the payout address before a rig hashes.

Malware swaps the address you copy: a green tile, the address checked on the wallet's screen, crosses an open window; a gray swapped one stops at a closed gate. Tess reads a receipt.

On Monday, November 16, 2026, visitors to the websites of 178 organizations ran code that nobody at those organizations wrote. The list, compiled by the security firm Report URI, includes the BBC, HSBC, Salesforce, Zoom and the hardware wallet maker Ledger. The code arrived through Optimizely, a web testing service those sites load on every visit. An attacker abused a flaw in Optimizely's account signup flow to insert rogue JavaScript into customer projects, and every browser that opened an affected page ran it. Optimizely says it removed the payload and fixed the flaw, and by late Monday evening UTC only one of the 188 infected snippets Report URI tracked still carried the malicious code.

What the code did is the part that matters for anyone who mines to their own address. It scanned pages for cryptocurrency addresses on Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Tron, Litecoin and other networks and replaced them with the attacker's own, in visible text, in form fields, in links and in whatever a visitor copied to the clipboard. It also skimmed card numbers typed into payment forms. Wallets tied to the attack had received roughly $7,000 by Monday evening, by Report URI's count, with a separate estimate from StepSecurity near $6,600. Hudson Rock found similar code moving through three other web services, starting with an earlier wave on November 13.

How Address-Swapping Malware Works

Nothing in this attack touched a wallet. No seed phrase was extracted, and nothing signed a transaction on anyone's behalf, according to the researchers who examined the recovered samples. Ledger's appearance on the list does not mean its devices or firmware were breached; the code ran in the browser, on the web page. The attack works one step earlier than a wallet. A person copies an address from a page, the page quietly hands the clipboard a different address, and the person pastes it somewhere that trusts it. The wallet then does exactly what it was told.

That is why address swapping keeps coming back. It does not need a stolen key or a broken signature scheme. It only needs one moment where a human moves an address from one place to another without reading it again.

Why Solo Miners Paste Addresses More Than Most

A solo miner moves a Bitcoin address around more often than a typical holder does. On a solo pool the payout address usually goes into the worker name field of the rig's firmware or into the pool connection settings, and many miners get that address by copying it from somewhere: a wallet's web page, an exchange deposit screen, a forum post, a setup guide, a note they emailed to themselves. Each of those copy steps is a place where code like Monday's could swap the address before it reaches the rig.

The consequence for a solo miner is quiet and permanent. On a non-custodial solo pool the block reward is written into the coinbase transaction and paid straight to the address the rig connected with. There is no balance at the pool to claw back and no support request that moves coins once a block confirms. If the address in the rig's configuration belongs to someone else, a found block pays someone else. Nobody can reverse that, NexusPool included, and that is the price of a pool that never holds your coins.

The good news is that this risk sits entirely on the configuration side, which means it can be checked before any work is done.

A Check Before Your Rig Hashes

Treat any address you copied from a web page as unverified until you compare it against a source that the page could not touch.

  • Read the address from the wallet itself. Open the receiving address in your wallet app or on your hardware wallet's own screen, not on a web page, and compare it with what you pasted into the rig. Check more than the first and last few characters, because attackers generate look-alike addresses that share them.
  • Check what the pool will pay. Payout Preflight rebuilds the coinbase transaction NexusPool would build for your address on the current block, so you can see where the reward lands before your rig finds anything. It shows the address you gave it. If a swapped address went in, Preflight shows the swapped one, which is why the comparison with your wallet's own screen is the step that catches the swap.
  • Re-check after any copy. A configuration you verified last month is only as good as the last time someone pasted into it. If you rebuilt a rig, changed firmware, or copied the address again from a page, compare it again.
  • Prefer typing from a trusted display. On a hardware wallet the address shown on the device screen is the one the device controls. A web page showing the "same" address proves nothing on a day like Monday.

What NexusPool Does and Does Not Do Here

NexusPool cannot see into your browser, and no pool can stop a page you visit from changing your clipboard. What a pool can do is make the destination of the reward visible and checkable. On NexusPool the coinbase pays your address and there is no balance for us to hold, which is how the non-custodial design on our technology page is built. Payout Preflight exists so the destination is something you can read before the work starts, instead of something you discover after a block. Each hour, Glass Ledger signs a receipt for the work the pool counted from each rig, under that rig's address, so the address your rig is mining to shows up in a record you can read.

None of this changes your odds. Network difficulty sets the odds on each hash, and no pool can change them, NexusPool included. A correct payout address does not make a block more likely. It only makes sure that the block, if your rig finds one, pays you.

The Lesson From a Bad Monday

The researchers' own summary of Monday is the one to keep: websites run whatever code their vendors send them, so one break-in at a vendor can reach hundreds of sites at once. A trusted brand on the page did not mean trusted code in the page. The defense is not to stop using the web. It is to stop trusting the copy step, and to compare every address against a screen the web could not reach before it goes into a rig.

If you are setting up a rig this week, start at the NexusPool home page, put your address in, and run Payout Preflight before you point any hash at it. If what Preflight shows matches your wallet's own screen, character for character, your configuration is right.

External source: CoinDesk, "Hackers planted crypto-stealing code on 178 organizations' sites, including HSBC, BBC and Ledger"

Trust nothing. Verify the payout address against your wallet's own screen.